The Middle East's Next Nuclear State; Strategic Insights, v. 8, issue 1(January 2009) by Tertrais, Bruno
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2009-01-01
The Middle East's Next Nuclear State;
Strategic Insights, v. 8, issue 1(January 2009)
Tertrais, Bruno
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 8, issue 1(January 2009)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11438
 The Middle East’s Next Nuclear State  
by Bruno Tertrais 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
The term “nuclear renaissance” is inappropriate when talking about the Middle East: there is not a 
single nuclear power reactor operating in the region. Nevertheless, no less than 13 countries 
have announced plans of intentions in this area between February 2006 and January 2007.[1] 
Growing energy and fresh water needs, as well as rising oil and gas prices, are mentioned as 
rationales. However, for many of them, the Iranian nuclear program is a key driver, and there is 
legitimate concern that some Middle East countries are interested in a weapons option. The 
discovery of the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria, as well as the extraordinary measures taken by 
Damascus to conceal its program, have heightened these fears. While concerns about the risks 
of proliferation in the Middle East have proven exaggerated in the past, there are good reasons to 
believe that they are now increasing—notably because of the dissemination of nuclear technology 
and of the Iranian factor.  
The following analysis is an attempt to predict which Middle East countries are the most likely to 
go nuclear after Iran.[2] 
Assessing the Proliferation Risk in the Middle East 
The Technical Angle  
The HEU way  
There is no known uranium enrichment capability in the Arab world or in Turkey, 
despite the possibility that the Khan network may have had other customers than 
Iran and Libya. Some countries in the region have voluntarily renounced 
enrichment, such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. If the 
Saudi concept of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) enrichment consortium was 
to materialize, it would be outside the region. To be sure, several key Middle East 
States such as Syria, Egypt or Algeria will not want to commit themselves to 
forego enrichment. However, due to their limited resources and the probable 
political costs, it is dubious that any of them will embark in an open, industrial-
scale enrichment project. The worst that can be expected in the short-to-medium 
term is a small, hidden enrichment plant based on past Pakistani transfers. It is 
dubious that Iran will itself transfer its technology in this area—except perhaps to 
Syria. Also, there is no significant research reactor in the region that operates 
with highly enriched uranium, which may create a proliferation risk.  
The plutonium way: research reactors  
One option for a would-be nuclear aspirant in the Middle East would be to use a research reactor. 
Some of them are particularly well-suited for that purpose. Graphite-moderated and heavy-water-
moderated reactors can be fuelled with natural uranium, thus optimizing their Pu-239 production 
potential. The fuel can be discharged without stopping reactor operations. Research reactors 
using enriched uranium as fuel can also be used for producing plutonium. However, they are 
generally less efficient for such a purpose and require techniques such as “blanketing” the reactor 
core with natural uranium. Outside Iran and Israel, three countries in the region have a reactor of 
a decent size, which also happen to be high neutron flux reactors, making them fairly efficient for 
plutonium production. However, none of them has the size required to make a significant quantity 
(SQ) of plutonium in no more than a year. The International Atomic Energy Agency has 
determined that it was not possible to produce 8 kilos of plutonium in a research reactor of less 
than 25 MWth. None of the Middle Eastern countries reactors is above this limit. Producing 
plutonium in a known research reactor would thus be an option only for a country willing to break 
with the IAEA inspections regime. 
The plutonium way: power reactors   
Using power reactors to produce military-usable plutonium will not be accessible to Middle East 
countries before 2015-2020, and is hardly an attractive option. It is reasonable to assume that 
power reactors in the region will be light water-moderated. The isotopic composition of the fuel 
irradiated in such reactors (which is generally withdrawn after some 4-5 years) is ill-suited for 
making bombs. It has a low content of Pu-239 (some 55-60%). Because it is conversely rich in 
Pu-240, it would make for highly unreliable weapons. Furthermore, the intense heat and 
radioactivity of such irradiated fuel would make it particularly difficult to handle. The only realistic 
option would be to use “low burn-up” material, that is, those fuel rods which have been irradiated 
only for a short period of time. For instance, using the rods that have stayed in the reactor for only 
one “cycle” (about 18 months) would contain only some 14% Pu-240. The material would be 
weapon-usable. According to one analysis, using technology equivalent to that of the United 
States in 1945, it would be possible to make for weapons that would have 70% probability of 
achieving a 1-kiloton yield.[3] But such activities would be detected by the IAEA. And the 
country’s fuel supplier would probably stop deliveries, which would imply stopping the reactor’s 
operation (with possible social and economic consequences). There are other, more cost-
effective options for country willing to embark in a nuclear military program. So far, there is no 
coincidence between power production programs and weapons production programs. Most 
countries producing nuclear-generated electricity do not have nuclear weapons. Several nuclear 
weapons programs have been initiated without any power reactor in the country (North Korea, 
Iraq, Libya, Israel). 
Plutonium separation  
Outside Israel, there is no known plutonium separation installation in the Middle East. As in the 
case of uranium enrichment, several countries in the region have already committed themselves 
to forego such installations. However, others (Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Libya, and to a lesser extent 
Saudi Arabia) have hot cells at the experimental level. They could conceivably develop a 
separation capability in a relatively short period of time. 
 
Economic aspects  
It is likely that the development of civilian nuclear programs in the Middle East will be a slow-
motion process. The magnitude of projects and intentions announced by countries in the region is 
striking. According to an internal study made by the French firm Areva in 2008, there are no less 
than 30 “proposed” (26) or “ordered” (4) reactors in the Middle East and Africa. Such plans are 
unrealistic. The international suppliers, which have reduced their capabilities in the 1990s after 
the Chernobyl accident, cannot meet such a growth in demand. Their preference will thus go to 
countries which already have a well-endowed nuclear infrastructure, and then only to Middle East 
customers—choosing those who are the most willing and able, such as the UAE. Most Middle 
East countries will not be able to satisfy the financial, legal and infrastructure requirements of 
nuclear power plants before a long time. 
Setting up a small military-dedicated nuclear program remains, however, accessible to most 
Middle East countries. North Korea is poorer than the vast majority of them. Syria and Egypt, for 
instance, which are not among the richest States of the region, are perfectly able to afford one. 
(See Table 1.) Access to a dedicated research reactor, plutonium separation installation, or a 
small uranium enrichment plant will thus largely depend on the availability of the main nuclear 
suppliers and on their willingness to “close their eyes” to proliferation risks. Another possibility is 
resorting to “rogue suppliers,” such as North Korea (the Syrian case being of course a case in 
point) and perhaps in the future Iran (IR-2 or IR-3 centrifuges would make it possible to build a 
small facility forming the basis of a breakout option)—and of course to private expertise, such as 
a reconstituted enrichment supplier network. 
The state of safeguards  
The IAEA safeguards system is seriously deficient in the region. A majority of countries in the 
region do not have an additional protocol into force, including Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria. In addition, most of the Middle East countries which benefit from a Small Quantities 
Protocol (SQP) have yet to accept the 2005 amended version, which states that an SQP ceases 
to be applicable as soon as a nuclear installation is planned. Such deficiencies are all the more 
serious since photographic examination of the Al-Kibar site in Syria shows that some countries 
may resort to extraordinary camouflage and deception measures to hide sensitive nuclear 
activities.[4]  
Conclusions  
Good news and bad news can be inferred from the above analysis. The good news is that 
national projects announced in recent years by Middle East countries will take a long time to 
come to fruition, and will have little direct usefulness for military purposes. For political and 
economic reasons, it is unlikely that any Middle East country will build, in the next 10 years, fuel 
cycle installations that would give it an overt breakout option (industrial-size reprocessing or 
enrichment plant). The bad news is that there are real causes for concern:  
• Some determined countries might secretly acquire or develop small, undeclared facilities 
dedicated to plutonium production and separation, or to the production of highly enriched 
uranium. The financial cost would be bearable to most countries. In the absence of an 
additional protocol, such an option would be available to States such as Algeria, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, or Syria.  
• Among the installations known to the IAEA, some reactors such as Es-Salam in Algeria 
or Inshas in Egypt could be used to produce military-usable plutonium. To be easily and 
fully exploitable, such an option would require ending Agency controls, or benefiting from 
a break-up of the NPT regime.  
• Civilian nuclear programs will contribute to the development of scientific expertise and 
technical know-how. They could also be useful to mask the existence of military-
dedicated activities.  
• Regional cooperation or a “division or labor” between several Middle East countries (e.g. 
Syria/Iran, Egypt/Saudi Arabia, several GCC countries…) would significantly diminish the 
time needed for them to develop a military option as well as the risks of being discovered.  
The Strategic Angle  
The security dimension  
When the scope of the Iranian nuclear program became publicly known in 2002-2003, the idea 
that it could be a stabilizing factor in the region was still fairly widespread.[5] Unease started to 
grow in 2005 with the radicalization of Iranian policy and the break-up of the negotiating process. 
The Iraqi insurrection and the war in Lebanon heightened the fears of a Shi’a regional revival 
which may be supported by Iran. The GCC proposal for a WMD-free zone in the Gulf (December 
2005) was a clear signal that the Iranian program was much more a problem for them than the 
Israeli program.  
The evolution of Western security guarantees in the region will certainly be a key parameter to 
determine the actual risks of further proliferation, and the Middle East is no exception to this 
logic.[6] 
However, only Turkey benefits from a clear-cut, formal and legally-binding Western security 
commitment. U.S. defense agreements with Gulf countries (which have not been made public) do 
not contain any constraining defense commitment, according to an authoritative analysis.[7] (The 
same can be said for British and French security agreements with several small Gulf States.) As 
they have not been formalized in a treaty, they can be revoked at any time. Furthermore, there is 
no equivalent in the region to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Also, some countries such 
as Egypt do not benefit from any security commitment despite its status of Major Non-NATO Ally 
since 1989. To be sure, the United States is seeking to deepen its strategic relationship with the 
GCC countries. Washington has announced its intention to increase its military equipment sales 
to these countries (2007), and to develop their missile defense capabilities.[8] A broad array of 
agreements was signed with Saudi Arabia at the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[9] A new “Carter doctrine,” that 
is, a solemn, public pledge to defend allies in the Middle East in light of the Iranian threat could 
dampen nuclear appetites in the region.[10] At the same time, the countries concerned may not 
wish to see such a public commitment. It could be seen by some parts of their elites as an act of 
“colonialism.”[11] It could also be disapproved by public opinions, which consider Israel and the 
United States as a much bigger threat than Iran.[12] Finally, even reinforced assurances would 
not alleviate the concerns of the Gulf countries. After the Iraqi adventure, they may fear that the 
United States will not have the stomach for another massive military operation in the region. And 
assuming Iran gets the Bomb, it will be difficult to convince them that the West will be ready to 
resist—given that, by definition, it would have been unwilling or unable to stop it from doing so. 
 
The political angle  
Not unlike Pakistan in the past—but in a much more publicized way— Iran has succeeded in 
making its nuclear program being seen as a symbol of sovereignty, modernity, and prestige. This 
may appeal others to proceed along the same path. In addition, some analysts note that events in 
the region since 2001 have resulted in “unprecedented severe criticism of Arab leadership by 
Arab citizens, Arab media and Arab intellectuals, which has motivated some Arab leaders to 
publicly discuss plans of nuclear acquisition to restore the appearance of strength and 
independence.”[13] The symbolic value of nuclear programs is thus particularly strong in the 
region. As former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in a private conversation about Iran, “It 
is a matter of pride. Like having a Porsche or a Jaguar.”[14] Of course, a nuclear military option 
would fully play such a role only if it was openly exercised. However, even in secret, a nuclear 
program can be a way to bolster the domestic legitimacy of the leadership, be it a “son of” (such 
as Bashar El-Asad in Syria, or Gamal Mubarak in Egypt), or the armed forces (such as in Turkey, 
or Algeria). 
Opportunity costs 
In current circumstances, it is highly dubious that existing Middle East regimes will decide to 
conduct openly military-related nuclear activities, which would imply withdrawing from the NPT. 
The political costs—and the associated costs in terms of sanctions—would be too high. The only 
realistic option would be to conduct secret activities. The Israeli bombing of the Syrian reactor in 
September 2007 has confirmed that the use of military force could be, in some cases, a viable 
option for treating a nuclear proliferation problem created by a secret program. The Israeli 
decision was certainly not taken lightly. One has to remember that there were heated debates 
within the Israeli cabinet on the wisdom to strike the Iraqi reactor in 1981. But the result is clear. 
And military preparation in the summer of 2007 show, in retrospect, that the country was ready to 
risk war with Syria. All this could give pause to a future would-be Middle East nuclear aspirant. At 
the same time, the same aspirants will have taken note of the fact that Syria suffered no other 
consequences than the loss of its reactor for having embarked in such an adventure. 
Conclusions  
Taking into account all factors that are likely to come into play in the strategic calculus that Middle 
East countries will make in the future, it seems that the nuclear temptation will indeed be strong. 
What follows is an attempt to determine which countries are more likely than others to go down 
the nuclear path. 
Countries of Particular Concern 
An overview of the nuclear landscape in the region reveals a very diverse picture. Egypt, Algeria 
and Turkey have significant nuclear activities. The first two may have attempted to embark in a 
full-fledged military program in the past, while the third is a NATO member. Syria, an ally of Iran, 
was generally considered a serious nuclear proliferation risk, but the revelation of the Al-Kibar 
reactor has altered this assessment. Saudi Arabia, an ally of the United States, has almost no 
known nuclear activity but is widely believed to be a leading candidate when assessing future 
proliferation risks in the region. Libya maintains a small nuclear program but has “recanted” and 
does not face any major security threat. Iraq was once considered the number one nuclear threat 
in the region but has been stripped of any serious capability. Morocco is an emerging player. 
Jordan, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates are willing to develop a nuclear program. The 
seven remaining countries have no nuclear research program and few serious plans in this 
area.[15] 
Algeria  
Because of its open support for Iran, of the existence of a significant national nuclear program 
which has raised suspicions in the past, and because it still does not have an additional protocol 
into force (even though it was approved by the Board of Governors in 2004), Algeria is clearly a 
country of concern. Algeria has a fairly developed nuclear infrastructure, which can be compared 
to that of Egypt. It includes two nuclear reactors as well as a small fuel fabrication plant. It also 
has significant technical and scientific competences, noteworthily within the Centre des sciences 
et de la technologie nucléaire (CESTEN). Its Es-Salam 15MWth reactor, operational since 1992, 
raises proliferation concerns : (1) Its construction in secret in the 1980s by China, in a desert area, 
at some point protected by anti-aircraft batteries ; (2) Its particular characteristics, which make it 
rather well-suited for military applications : a high neutron flux reactor, moderated with heavy 
water.[16] Some fuel rods may have been withdrawn without IAEA having been notified.[17] 
Questions about the Algerian nuclear program are all the more relevant since cooperation with 
China has continued throughout the 1990s, including through the sale of hot cells.[18] (Algerian 
interest for hot cells was confirmed at the occasion of an official visit to South Korea in 
2006.)[19] The status of Algerian plutonium separation capabilities is uncertain.[20] It has been 
qualified as “dormant” by knowledgeable analysts.[21] In the absence of an additional protocol, it 
is not certain that the IAEA is able to verify all Algerian nuclear activities. It also has been noted 
that there were very few Algerian publications in this field despite a fairly large number of 
scientists and engineers working on nuclear issues.[22] Of course, Algeria does not have any 
immediate reason to launch or re-start military-related nuclear activities. Despite troubled 
relations with some of its neighbors (Libya, Morocco), it does not face any significant and 
immediate military threat. However, for status reasons, it may not want to leave Egypt or Saudi 
Arabia become the “first Arab nuclear power.” A nuclear program may also contribute to 
strengthen the armed forces’ control on political decision-making, as has been the case in 
Pakistan. 
Egypt 
Cairo has announced its intention to relaunch its civilian nuclear program. Its rapid electricity 
consumption growth, dwindling oil resources, and strategic location which makes its grid 
connected to the two transnational regional electricity networks, make it well-placed to be a future 
regional leader nuclear electricity generation, despite financial difficulties.[23] Egypt’s 
longstanding nuclear experience makes this ambition credible. It has two research reactors, 
including a high-neutron flux Multi-Purpose Reactor (MPR) located at the Inshas research center. 
The 22MWth MPR could produce 6.6 kilos of plutonium a year assuming 300 days of 
operation.[24] Egypt also has since 1998 two fuel-making installations, a laboratory (Semi-Pilot 
Fuel Laboratory, SPFL) and a full-fledged plant (Fuel Manufacturing Pilot Plant, FMPP) which 
fabricates fuel for the MPR reactor. It also has significant uranium reserves. As is now known, 
Egypt has made experiments that could be useful to a military program, before and after its 
safeguards agreement came in force (1982). These involved the production of uranium metal, 
irradiation of natural uranium targets, and chemical dissolution of fuel elements.[25] The Atomic 
Energy Agency (AEA) has hot cells which could be used for experimental plutonium separation, 
located at a dedicated facility (Hot Laboratory and Waste Management Center, HLWMC).[26] It 
has no intention to forego sensitive fuel cycle activities: for Cairo, this could only be an acceptable 
option if it concerned “the whole region.”[27] Egypt is thus one of the only Middle East countries 
which could envision a full-fledged, autonomous nuclear program. Despite the apparent 
abandonment of military-related projects decades ago, President Mubarak has stated several 
times in oblique terms that the option remains. Cairo has three potential motivations for a military 
program: (i) It considers itself as a leader—if not the national leader—of the Arab world, and both 
the rise of Iranian influence and the activism of Saudi diplomacy probably give Cairo reasons to 
consider its options to bolster its regional status; (ii) On the longer run, Iran could be considered a 
potential threat, given its support for militant movements in Lebanon, the West Bank and 
especially Gaza; (iii) A nuclear program may have domestic political benefits: the Muslim 
Brotherhood openly favors such an option, ostensibly to “balance” the Israeli program.[28] Cairo 
refuses to sign the additional protocol, arguing that it is a voluntary measure which would be 
unacceptable to subscribe to given that Israel has not even signed the NPT.[29] It could thus 
conceivably conduct military-related activities with a low risk of detection—banking on the fact 
that Israel would not dare striking military-dedicated activities in Egypt, who contrary to Syria is 
technically at peace with its neighbor and is one of the few Middle East countries recognizing its 
existence. However, in current circumstances Cairo will refrain from any risky move, since it 
would put at risk the two pillars of its security (peace with Israel and U.S. assistance) while the 
political benefits would be limited if existing at all, because the program would be secret. 
Libya 
Libya’s nuclear program has been reduced to its civilian research component. However, Tripoli 
retains significant infrastructure and expertise, which would be useful if the country wanted launch 
a military program again. Its IRT-1 has been operational since 1981. It is a high neutron flux 
reactor, but one whose plutonium production remains limited because of its power (10 MWth). 20 
kilos of HEU stocked at Tajura have been taken to Russia and the United States, and the reactor 
is being converted to use LEU as fuel.[30] The Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) also 
comprises a number of experimental facilities: a 100 W neutron generator, a TMA-4A tokamak, 
and hot cells. Numerous undeclared experiments of uranium targets irradiation were conducted at 
Tajura between 1984 and 1990, with the production of small quantities of plutonium.[31] There is 
no indication today that Libya could be willing to embark again in a military program, and the 
country enjoys rather good relations with Algeria and Egypt. However, Tripoli is keen on 
maintaining its expertise.[32] 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi experience in the nuclear field is extremely limited. The Atomic Energy Research 
Institute,(AERI), established in 1988, et le Nuclear Engineering Department of King Abdul Aziz 
University, founded in 1977, conduct research on the use of nuclear energy for water desalination 
and medical treatment. The King Faisal Hospital has a small cyclotron and five hot cells.[33] The 
AERI has four laboratories working on separation of elements.[34] Having joined the NPT only 
after the controversy over its acquisition of Chinese CSS-2 missiles (1988), Saudi Arabia remains 
the only significant IAEA member which does not have a comprehensive safeguards agreement 
in force. This is not necessarily a cause for concern—Saudis are not keen on having international 
inspections on their soil for religious reasons—but it would allow the country to embark in 
clandestine activities with a low risk of detection. Saudi leaders are extremely worried about the 
Iranian nuclear program, and the country’s diplomacy is trying both to limit Shi’a influence in the 
region while maintaining a dialogue with Tehran. Like in Israel, Iran is frequently described as 
an “existential threat.”[35] The prestige in the Muslim world of an Iranian Bomb could be a 
“political humiliation” for Riyadh.[36] Perhaps the country could live with an Iran at the threshold; 
but an overt capability, including withdrawal from the NPT and maybe a nuclear test, would be 
unacceptable to Saudi Arabia and force it to reexamine its strategic options.[37] Credible sources 
have indicated that Saudi authorities have envisaged three options (which may not be 
alternatives): acquisition of nuclear weapons, alliance with a nuclear power, and promotion of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone.[38] Prince Turki has implicitly confirmed the existence of the 
document.[39] According to U.S. ambassador Chas Freeman, en 2003, King Fahd demanded a 
nuclear guarantee to the United States in case Iran did obtain nuclear weapons.[40] But lack of 
trust between the two countries may push Riyadh to look for other avenues. Saudi Arabia fears 
an arrangement between Washington and Tehran which would lead to a greater Iranian role in 
the region.[41] And it could also seek a nuclear deterrent to prevent a hypothetical future U.S. 
operation against its own territory—for instance after a second 9/11 type attack.[42] There are 
persistent rumors of a possible Saudi-Pakistani understanding on these issues, and the Saudi 
2005 request to the IAEA for a Small Quantities Protocol has heightened suspicions. It is 
reasonable to assume that discussions of nuclear cooperation have taken place between the two 
countries (as well as discussions on possible sales of Pakistani missiles to replace the ageing 
Chinese CSS-2.)[43] However, in the post-AQ Khan context, it would be surprising that such 
cooperation gave birth to concrete measures. At this point in time, only a Pakistani “additional 
guarantee” under certain circumstances appears a reasonable possibility. In the longer run, 
further cooperation with China could also be an option, under changed strategic circumstances. 
Finally, another option open to Saudi Arabia would be to fund another Muslim country’s program, 
as was probably the case for Pakistan’s own program and perhaps others. For the time being, 
Riyadh wants to show good faith and has reportedly declared its intention to forego acquisition of 
sensitive nuclear technologies.[44]   
Syria 
Open activities make Syria a second-tier country in the field of nuclear research in the region. 
Damascus has two research centers which conduct such activities (Scientific Research Institute, 
SRI, and Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Center, NRC), but they produce few publications.[45] 
Its only installations declared to the IAEA are a Miniature Neutron Source and a small cyclotron. 
Syria has never made public any military nuclear ambition, though it has not hidden that it seeks 
to balance Israeli superiority by unconventional means.[46] However, the discovery of the Al-
Kibar reactor project has changed the picture. It has confirmed that a nuclear aspirant without an 
additional protocol into force could escape detection for several years. Also, it has revealed that 
North Korea was ready to embark on large-scale nuclear cooperation plans abroad. The Syrian 
rationale for nuclear weapons was probably to protect its territory against a U.S. or Israeli attack. 
If this was the case, it means that Damascus did not believe that Tehran would protect it even 
though the two countries probably have a mutual defense commitment.[47] Bashar El-Asad may 
also have wanted to consolidate its power through such a program—which was apparently 
started right after he came to power.[48] An area of concern is the question of the Syrian ability to 
separate plutonium. (Syrian interest for hot cells had been mentioned in the 2005 CIA Report to 
Congress on WMD acquisition.[49] And it has been recently revealed that Damascus had two 
Chinese-provided hot cells, which are not under IAEA surveillance.)[50] In the absence of a 
dedicated installation, perhaps another country was in charge of such operations; alternatively, if 
such a capability existed and remained undiscovered, it could be used by another country. One 
hypothesis to be kept in mind is Syria embarking in a second nuclear program, this time based on 
HEU. There were discussions between the Abdul Qadeer Khan network and Damascus on 
possible centrifuge procurement. Assuming these did not produce any concrete result, perhaps 
Syria could benefit from North Korean or Iranian assistance in this area.  
Turkey 
Like most Arab countries, Turkey has announced its intention to restart its civilian nuclear 
program. It already has a very significant nuclear infrastructure. Its main research center 
(Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center) has two modern (1986) pilot installations for 
conversion and fuel fabrication.[51] The involvement of several Turkish firms in the AQ Khan 
network indicates that there is industrial know-how in the country which could be of use to a 
uranium enrichment program. However, Ankara claims to be uninterested by enrichment.[52] The 
country operates two research reactors: a light-water 5 MWth reactor;[53] and a small Triga Mark-
II unit, which is being converted to operated on LEU.[54] It also has a small waste treatment 
facility (Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility). Scientists have made computer 
simulations of reprocessing with the Purex process.[55] Generally speaking, nuclear science and 
technology is very active in the country. Also, Turkey is one of the only States in the region to 
have started setting up the regulatory mechanisms needed for larger-scale nuclear programs, 
under the aegis of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK). Turkey is moderately worried 
about the Iranian nuclear program. It has generally good relations with its neighbor. It is covered 
by a formal nuclear guarantee, backed by a multilateral alliance, and has nuclear weapons on its 
territory (including for use by Turkish aircraft). However, Ankara may be losing its sense of 
confidence about NATO. At two occasions—1991 and 2003—its allies were perceived as hesitant 
to fulfill their security commitments. The new generation of Turkish officers do not trust NATO as 
much as the previous one.[56] In addition, political relations with the West have become more 
difficult because of Iraq, controversy about the 1915 events, and a European reluctance to give a 
clear perspective for entry into the European Union. Turkish public opinion has an extremely 
negative view of the United States.[57] (It is also opposed to the continued stationing of U.S. 
nuclear weapons.)[58] Ankara’s perception of the Western security guarantee will be a key for its 
future nuclear choices.[59] The military option would be an extreme one: a choice in that direction 
would require a deepening of the crisis in confidence with both the United States and Europe. 
Additionally, domestic power games may come into play: a nuclear program might be a way to 
consolidate the place of the military in the political decision-making process. Defiance vis-à-vis 
Iran is stronger in the so-called “kemalist” circles.[60]  
Net Assessment  
An attempt to quantify the proliferation risks  
A quantitative analysis, which takes into account the analysis laid out above, as well as other 
parameters, allows for a more fine-grained picture. What follows is a summary of a study 
conducted by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique in 2008, which attempts to assess the 
likelihood of each Middle East country to go nuclear.  
The quantitative analysis of the causes of proliferation has been attempted by two major studies 
published in 2004 and 2007.[61] These revealed interesting insights, such as a correlation 
between economic integration and liberalization, on the one hand, and the degree of maturation 
of a nuclear program, on the other. However, they did not aim at being predictive. They are also 
outdated since the data they used do not go beyond 1992 for the first study and 2000 for the 
second one. 
The crude model that was used by the FRS study includes positive and negative determinants. It 
aims at determining what the overall assessment of each State—considered for the sake of this 
study as a rational and homogeneous actor—would be when thinking about going nuclear. It is 
important to note that in the current circumstances, unless Iran goes overtly nuclear, this would 
probably mean “shortening their development times” rather than actually embarking in a full-
fledged nuclear weapons programs.[62] Such nuclear “hedging” may imply increasing know-how 
and training, import dual-use goods, conduct small-scale experiments in secret, and leaving the 
options of enrichment and reprocessing open. 
Positive determinants that were been identified include (1) threat perception, (2) political 
motivations (domestic and international), (3) financial means, (4) existing nuclear installations, (5) 
existing nuclear experience and know-how, (6) current civilian nuclear projects, and (7) the 
existence of an active ballistic missile program. Negative determinants include (1) the existence 
of a foreign protection, (2) the degree of IAEA controls, (3) economic openness and 
liberalization,[63](4) regional integration, and (5) dependence on U.S. assistance. Each of these 
parameters was quantified, and some of them were given a more important value than others. 
(For instance, the value of “threat perception” was doubled, based on the hypothesis that this 
factor is generally a prime driver in mature nuclear weapons programs.) The results are as 
follows:[64]  
• Egypt (+13)  
• Syria (+12)  
• Algeria (+11)  
• Saudi Arabia (+11)  
• Turkey (+4)  
• Libya (+4)  
• Iraq (+2)  
• United Arab Emirates (0)  
• Morocco (-3)  
• Tunisia (-5)  
• Kuwait (-8)  
• Jordan (-9)  
This assessment brings three interesting lessons. The first one is that Algeria ranks in the same 
category as Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia as one of the Middle East countries most likely to go 
down the nuclear route. The second one is that it could have been a good predictor of a Syrian 
nuclear program (given that it did not take into account the Al-Kibar surprise). The third one is that 
Turkey ranks fairly low, contrary to many predictions. 
Dynamic scenarios  
This was a static analysis and of course, many future events could alter the value assigned to key 
parameters, thus affecting the overall results. For instance, the opportunity costs of going nuclear 
may be significantly affected by a change in the “supply” side of the equation. (A serious US-
Pakistani or US-China crisis may affect the readiness of these countries to provide nuclear 
technologies to Middle Eastern countries.) An overtly nuclear Iran (which would imply a 
withdrawal from the NPT) would significantly affect the “threat perception” and “political 
motivation” parameters for several countries; if it was followed by the crumbling of the NPT/IAEA 
regime, the “IAEA controls” factor would conversely change. If Israel reacted to an overtly nuclear 
Iran by making its nuclear “coming out,” the political motivation for some countries would 
significantly increase. Also, external factors such as a major crisis of confidence in the U.S. 
protection granted to several key actors in the region would affect the “foreign protection” 
parameter. A conjunction of several of these events would almost certainly lead one or several of 
these countries to actually embark in an operation nuclear weapons program.  
Then there are possible “cascading” effects. While these are sometimes overstated, they could 
indeed exist. For instance, it is not certain that Egypt would want to be the first Arab nuclear 
country—but it certainly would not want to be the second. Interesting scenarios can also be 
devised for the longer run. For instance, if Egypt and Algeria made moves in that direction, what 
conclusions would Libya draw for its own security and status? And if Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
Syria were to make moves in the same direction, how would Iraq feel if it was surrounded by 
nuclear-capable countries?  
Of course, there could also be positive dynamics. For instance, if Israel and Syria concluded a 
durable peace, then the risk that the latter would go nuclear would significantly diminish. However, 








Table 1: Known Nuclear Installations[65]   
  Name  Location  Subsidiary 
arrangement 
Date  Type and 
fuel  
Power  
ALGERIA Nur reactor  Algiers  No  1989  Pool  
Light water  
LEU 20%  
1 MWth  
   




No  1992  Heavy water  
LEU 3%  
15 MWth  
   
  Aures-1 facility  Ain 
Oussera  
No           
  UDEC fuel 
fabrication plant  
Draria  No           
EGYPT ET-RR-1 reactor Inshas  Yes  1961  Tank  
Light water  
LEU 10%  
2 MWth  
  ET-RR-2 (MPR) 
reactor  
Inshas  No  1998  Pool  
Light water  
LEU 20%  
22 MWth  
   
  NCB conversion 
plant  
Inshas  No           
  FMPP fuel 
fabrication plant  
Inshas  No           
  HLWMC Waste 
management 
laboratory  
Inshas              
  Cyclotron HCF  Inshas              
IRAQ C Storage site  Tuwaitha  No           
LIBYA IRT-1 reactor  Tajura  Yes  1981  Pool  




10 MWth  
   




Table 1 (cont.): Known Nuclear Installations[65]   
  Name  Location  Subsidiary 
arrangement 
Date  Type and 
fuel  
Power  
MOROCCO MA-R1 reactor        2007  TRIGA Mk-II  
Light water  
LEU  
2 MWth  
SYRIA SRR-1 reactor  Damascus  Yes  1996  MNSR  
Light water  
1 kg HEU 
90%  
0.03 MWth  
   
TURKEY TR-2 reactor  Istanbul  ?[66]  1981  Pool (MTR)  
Light water  
LEU 20%  
5 MWth  
   
  ITU-TRR 
reactor  
Istanbul  Yes  1979  TRIGA Mk-II  
Light water  
LEU 
(converted)  
0.25 MWth  
   
  Cekmece 
nuclear 
research and 
training center  
Istanbul  Yes           













Table 2: Status of Main Conventions and Treaties[67]   













Algeria  INFCIRC/531  








-  Ratified on 11 
July 2003  
Ratified on 11 
February 
1998  
Bahrein  Signed 19 
September 2007, 
not in force  
No  Yes (new), 
but not in 
force  
Ratified on 12 
April 2004  
NA  
Egypt  INFCIRC/302  
30 June 1982  
No  -  Signed on 14 
October 1996  
Signed on 11 
April 1996  
Iraq  INFCIRC/172  
29 February 1972  
No  -  No  NA  
Iran  INFCIRC/214  
15 May 1974  




-  No  NA  
Israel  INFCIRC/249/Add.1 
4 April 1975  
No  -  No  NA  
Jordan  INFCIRC/258  
21 February 1978  
Yes  
28 July 1998  
Yes (old), in 
force  
Ratified on 25 
August 1998  
NA  
Kuwait  INFCIRC/607  
7 March 2002  
Yes  
2 June 2003  
Yes (old), in 
force  
Ratifié on 6 May 
2003  
NA  
Lebanon  INFCIRC/191  
5 March 1973  




Signed on 16 
September 2005  
NA  
Libya  INFCIRC/282  




-  Ratified on 6 
January 2004  
Ratified on 11 
May 2005  
Morocco  INFCIRC/228  
18 February 1975  





in 2007  
Ratified on 17 
April 2000  
Signed on 11 
April 1996  
 
Table 2 (cont.): Status of Main Conventions and Treaties[67]   













Mauritania Signed on 2 
June 2003, not 
in force  
Signed on 2 
June 2003, 
not ratified  
Yes (old), 
but not in 
force  
Ratified on 30 
April 2003  
Ratified on 24 
February 1998 
Oman  INFCIRC/691  
5 September 
2006  
No  Yes (new), 
in force  
Ratified on 13 
January 2003  
NA  




No  -  Ratified on 3 




Signed on 16 
June 2005, not 
in force  
No  Yes (old), in 
force  
No  NA  
Syria  INFCIRC/407  
18 May 1992  
No  -  No  NA  
Tunisia  INFCIRC/381  
13 March 1990  
Signed on 24 
May 2005, not 
ratified  
-  Ratified on 23 
September 2004  
Signed on 11 
April 1996  




17 July 2001  
-  Ratified on 16 






9 October 2003 
No  Yes (old), in 
force  
Ratified on 18 
September 2000  
NA  
Yémen  INFCIRC/614  
14 August 2002 
No  Yes (old), in 
force  
Signed on 30 
September 1996  
NA  
   
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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